International agreements are an important element of the world economic system, but questions remain as to why they are necessary. In trade theory, the terms-of-trade hypothesis posits that countries use tariffs in part to improve their terms of trade and that trade agreements cause them to internalize the costs that such terms-of-trade shifts impose on other countries. As yet, however, the hypothesis is largely untested on the most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff schedules of the vast majority of WTO members, which cover the bulk of world trade. This paper investigates whether MFN tariffs set by existing WTO members in the Uruguay round are consistent with the terms-of-trade hypothesis. We present a model of multilateral trade negotiations featuring endogenous participation that leads the resulting tariff schedules to display terms-of-trade effects. Specifically, the model predicts that the level of the importer's tariff resulting from negotiations should be negatively related to the product of exporter concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (sum of squared export shares), and the importer's market power, as measured by the inverse elasticity of export supply, on a product-by-product basis. We test this hypothesis using data on tariffs, trade and production across more than 30 WTO countries and find strong support. We estimate that the internalization of terms of trade effects through WTO negotiations has lowered the average tariff of these countries by 22 to 27 percent compared to its non-cooperative level.
Introduction
the negotiators do not fully internalize the terms-of-trade effects of reducing that tariff, and thus the negotiated tariff level continues to bear the imprint of market power. In a standard competitive model, when an importer cuts an MFN tariff, all exporters subject to that tariff experience the same terms-of-trade improvement, which is proportional to the importer's market power. Yet the welfare gain each exporter derives from this improvement depends on its share of total exports to the importer's market. Thus, if only a fraction of the exporters participate in negotiations over the tariff (and, importantly, if there is no way to fully extract reciprocal concessions from non-participants), then only a fraction of the potential gains from liberalization is internalized, corresponding to the aggregate export share of the participants. In practice, it is typically only the exporters with the largest export shares, known as "principal suppliers," that actively engage in negotiations over a given tariff. 3 This suggests that internalization can be captured by a measure of how concentrated the market is in the hands of the top exporters for each importer-product pair.
Hence, if the terms-of-trade hypothesis is correct, the tariff schedules of WTO members should be such that, for products with high concentration of the top exporters, corresponding to full or nearly full internalization, the negotiated tariffs bear little if any relation to the importer's market power.
For products with low concentration of the top exporters, however, greater importer market power should be associated with higher tariffs, as in standard optimal tariff theory.
Testing this hypothesis requires measures of both concentration of the top exporters and importer market power. The difficulty in measuring the former is that we do not observe exactly which top exporters participate in negotiations over each tariff, and WTO rules offer no precise formula for deducing them. The principal supplier rule states that "countries may request concessions on products of which they individually, or collectively, are the principal suppliers to the countries from which the concessions are asked," but it does not specify exactly how large a supplier must be to qualify (WTO 1995, p. 992) or how strictly the rule is enforced. Thus, we model the participation decision as an endogenous choice within a many-country, many-good game of multilateral trade negotiations. We show that the export share of the participating exporters can be captured by a measure of overall exporter concentration: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (the sum of squared 3 Horn and Mavroidis (2001) note that "...In the WTO, negotiations for the most part take place between subsets of Member countries. Sometimes this is 'officially sanctioned,' as in the case of Principal Supplier negotiations. But also in seemingly multilateral negotiations, the 'actual' negotiations occur between a very limited number of countries..." (Horn and Mavroidis 2001, p. 34) . export shares). This index determines the upper bound of concessions an importer can extract from the exporters of a good in any agreement requiring voluntary participation, which we show is the key to determining the extent of participation and hence the internalization of terms of trade effects.
Measuring importer market power is conceptually straightforward -it is equal to the inverse elasticity of export supply -though available estimates tend to be very imprecise. We thus take an eclectic approach. Our main specification uses estimates from Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006) , which have the advantage of being the most comprehensive available in terms of country and product coverage. Other specifications use proxy measures that are both theoretically plausible determinants of market power and are also correlated with the inverse elasticity estimates. The proxies we consider are the log of GDP, which varies by country, and the Rauch index of product differentiation (Rauch 1999) , which varies by product. 4 To conduct the empirical analysis, we gather data on tariffs, trade, production and political organization for a range of WTO countries between 1993 and 2000. We estimate the determinants of MFN tariff schedules covering the period 1995-2000, using covariates from 1993, the final year of the Uruguay Round negotiations (signed in April 1994 and implemented gradually thereafter). 5 Our main dataset contains bound and applied tariffs and trade flows for 36 countries, drawn from COMTRADE and UNCTAD's TRAINS. These vary at the 6-digit HS level, which is the most detailed classification common to all countries. The one drawback of this dataset is its poor match with the available production data, which is drawn from UNIDO's INDSTAT4. Production by sector is necessary to control for domestic political economy determinants of tariffs. For robustness, therefore, we construct a second dataset for 25 countries (20 of which overlap with the first), selected for the completeness of their production data. This second dataset follows the more aggregated 4-digit ISIC(Rev.2) classification and is based on the World Bank Trade and Production database (WBTPD) (Nicita and Olarreaga 2001), which we expand and update. In both datasets, political organization is measured by the presence or absence of business associations by sector and country.
The empirical results strongly support the terms-of-trade hypothesis. Using the log GDP mea- 4 Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008) find these measures to be significant determinants of the inverse export supply elasticity for non-WTO countries. 5 Our goal is to explain the variation in tariff levels across countries and products rather than intertemporal tariff changes resulting from the Uruguay Round per se. While MFN tariff levels may have undergone numerous changes before and after 1993, the Uruguay Round is the last time they were adjusted through negotiations. For many of the developing countries in our sample, this was also the first time.
sure, we find that the tariff schedules of larger countries are more sensitive to cross-product variation in exporter concentration than those of smaller countries, which is consistent with the theory. Using the other two market power measures (and thus exploiting within-country variation in market power), we find a positive and significant effect of market power on MFN tariff levels, which diminishes significantly with exporter concentration. These results are consistent across datasets, are robust to controlling for domestic and foreign political economy factors, preferential trade agreements, industry and country fixed effects and a host of other factors, and hold for both bound and applied tariffs. They are further reinforced by instrumental variables estimation. In our view, this is the clearest evidence to date that the terms-of-trade motive drives trade policy and that trade agreements are intended to neutralize this motive.
Finally, our estimates allow us to quantify the effects of the WTO negotiations. We find that the internalization of terms-of-trade effects through WTO negotiations makes the average applied MFN tariff of our sample countries between 22 and 27 percent lower than its non-cooperative level (i.e., that which our model predicts, based on the same data, absent any internalization), and this figure is larger for developed economies. This accounts for a little over half of the total liberalization that has occured since 1945, with the remainder attributable to diminished unilateral motives for protection. However, this accounts for only 75 to 88 percent of all tariff liberalization that is possible through internalization, since free riding prevents some terms-of-trade effects from being internalized. Machines, transport equipment and instruments have experienced the greatest terms-of-trade driven tariff reductions, while agriculture, prepared food, textiles and footwear have experienced the smallest. This suggests that the explanation for the high tariffs in the latter sectors goes beyond the domestic political-economy factors emphasized in the literature (see, Rodrik [1995] for a survey). In particular, low levels of exporter concentration in these sectors inhibit trade negotiations from neutralizing the terms-of-trade motive.
Section 2 presents the model of trade negotiations from which we derive our main predictions and our measure of exporter concentration. Section 3 describes the cross-country data sets used.
Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy and main results of the analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Theory
In this section, we present a model of trade negotiations under MFN to motivate our empirical analysis. We generalize Ludema and Mayda (2009) to the case of many countries and many goods and posit an extensive-form negotiation game, instead of the mechanism design approach of the earlier paper. While the two approaches are complementary, the advantage of the game is that it is based on actual WTO procedures, provides a full account of government behavior and allows us to relax several assumptions (such as the presence of a mechanism designer and the independence of negotiations across goods).
The underlying trade model is based on the "competing exporters" framework, originally developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1998) and used extensively in the literature on MFN (e.g., Saggi
[2009]). There is a set of countries C, a single numeraire good, and a set of non-numeraire goods Γ. For notation, we will generally use a superscript to denote country of origin and a subscript to denote country of destination and product, so for example, X j ik denotes the quantity of good k sold by country j in country i. We assume constant returns to scale, with the numeraire requiring a single homogenous factor, labor. Each non-numeraire is produced using labor and capital, where capital is product-destination specific. Each country has a representative consumer with a quasilinear utility function, and markets are segmented. Together these assumptions imply that each country competes with every other country for each destination market, but prices are independent across markets.
The Base Model
In the base model, we assume that governments maximize welfare and that all trade is governed by MFN, i.e., we abstract from political economy and FTA considerations. For any country i ∈ C, let τ ik , p ik , p * ik and M ik denote, respectively, the MFN tariff (measured as one plus the ad valorem rate), the domestic price, the world price and the total imports of good k in country i. Let θ j ik = X j ik /M ik denote j 's exports as a share of i's imports of k, where j = i. Let µ ik and ξ ik denote the elasticities of import demand and export supply, respectively, where ξ ik is assumed to be common to all exporters (and thus θ j ik is independent of τ ik ). The welfare country i derives from good k is given by,
where s ik denotes consumer surplus and π i jk is the profit earned from sales to market j. Total welfare is given by k∈Γ w ik . We make two important assumptions regarding how, and in what form, countries exchange concessions. First, we assume that in addition to setting tariffs, countries can make side payments in the form of transfers of the numeraire good. This assumption is a useful theoretical starting point, because it allows tariffs to be set based on efficiency considerations, while side payments can be used to achieve the desired division of surplus. As a factual matter, MFN tariffs are not the sole currency of the WTO. For example, Finger, Reincke, and Castro (2002) provide evidence of large and pervasive deviations from balance in MFN tariff concessions in the Uruguay Round. Part of the explanation is that the scope of negotiations was far wider than tariffs, including a host of non-tariff issues, such as services, technical barriers to trade, intellectual property protection, investment measures and government procurement. In addition, there are numerous bilateral interactions between countries both inside the WTO (e.g., disputes) and outside (e.g., bilateral investment treaties). In our view, transfers are a reasonable way to capture the flexibility in concessions that these "issue linkages" afford. The second assumption is that countries cannot be made to reciprocate tariff cuts that they did not request. While the WTO principle of reciprocity ostensibly applies to all tariff reductions, in practice countries have little leverage to demand compensation from countries not present at the bargaining table. It is well documented, for example, that countries making unilateral tariff reductions have had very little success in getting "credit" for those reductions in GATT rounds. An implication of this assumption is that MFN can give rise to a free rider problem (Viner 1924; Caplin and Krishna 1988; Ludema and Mayda 2009 ). Finger (1979) , Lavergne (1983) and Ludema and Mayda (2009) supply evidence of this problem in GATT tariff negotiations.
In the Appendix, we relax both of the above assumptions. We show that adding a cost to side payments leads countries to alter their negotiated tariffs towards more bilateral balance but does not alter our main conclusions. We also show that our model can accommodate any degree of reciprocity from non-participants less than 100% with no effect on the results.
The Negotiation Game
Our model of negotiations is based on the item-by-item request and offer method of tariff negotiations, which is GATT's most common procedure historically and which characterized the Uruguay Round. 6 It consists of four stages. First, each country i submits to each other country j a "request" list R i j ⊆ Γ, indicating the set of country j 's tariffs over which i would like to negotiate. Second, each country submits an "offer" list O i ⊆ Γ, indicating which of its own tariffs are negotiable. Third, countries meet in pairs (i, j ), each one engaging in simultaneous bilateral bargaining over the items
The negotiation between each pair of countries seeks to determine a set of bilateral compensation functions:
is the compensation that country i (as the exporter) pays to country j (as the importer) as a function of τ jk . These functions are equivalent to the contribution schedules found in common agency games (Bernheim and Whinston 1986 ). In keeping with that literature, we focus on truthful compensation functions of the form, c i jk
, where u i jk is a constant and is interpreted as the payoff that importer j guarantees to exporter i from good k if their bilateral negotiation is successful. The negotiation between each pair of countries is resolved according to the Nash bargaining solution, taking the outcome of the negotiations of all other pairs as given and setting the bilateral compensation functions of the pair to zero in case of disagreement. In the fourth and final stage, each importer chooses its tariff schedule so as to maximize its payoff inclusive of compensation. 7 Note that while the negotiations over compensation functions are bilateral, MFN links them together via a common tariff and thus "multilateralizes" the negotiations. 6 The first five GATT rounds used this method exclusively, whereas the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds were characterized by a formula approach, whereby each country cuts tariffs across-the-board according to a certain formula agreed to at the outset. In fact, however, countries deviated considerably from the formula cuts on an item-by-item basis, and many countries ignored the formula entirely (Hoda, 2001, pp. 30-32) . Negotiations over these deviations took place on an item-by-item basis between principal suppliers. According to Hoda (2001, p. 47) , "Thus a linear or formula approach did not obviate the need for bilateral negotiations: they only gave the participants an additional tool to employ in the bargaining process."
7 Here we are assuming that if a good is not included in a country's offer list, the country chooses its noncooperative optimal tariff. Alternatively, we could assume that such tariffs revert to a pre-existing tariff held over from some previous negotiating round. This would effectively add an exogenous upper bound on the negotiated tariff found below in equation (2) . However, in our view it would be counterproductive to treat pre-existing tariffs as exogenous, when the purpose is to explain current tariff levels (which is the focus of our empirical work). To endogenize the pre-existing tariff would require a dynamic model that accounts for gradualism. Our static model effectively collapses all GATT rounds into a single round, and thus the noncooperative tariff is an appropriate baseline. In section 4.4, we consider a dynamic adaptation of the model suitable for examining changes in tariffs across rounds.
To solve the final stage, let A ik denote the set of exporters participating in negotiations over good k with importer i. Note that this set is empty for any good not included on the importer's offer list; otherwise, it is the set of countries requesting negotiations over k with i. The tariff chosen by country i in the final stage will be τ n ik (A ik ) = arg max w ik (τ ik ) +
Denoting the joint payoff of the participants by
Thus, for each good, the tariff emerging from negotiations is Pareto efficient for the participants in that good. Setting W
where
ik is the aggregate export share of participants. Equation (2) is key to our paper. Evaluated at Θ ik = 0, it equals the standard noncooperative optimal tariff, which depends on importer market power, as measured by the inverse elasticity of export supply. Evaluated at Θ ik = 1, it equals free trade and importer market power is irrelevant. In general, the negotiated tariff depends on both importer market power and exporter participation.
Given (2) we can find the Nash bargaining solution for countries i and j. This involves choosing u i jk and u j ik to maximize the Nash product,
Maximization of (3) yields an expression for the net compensation country i must pay to j :
The right-hand side of the top line of (4) is the gross compensation i pays for the negotiated tariffs on goods it exports to j. It depends on two components. The first component is the increase in country i's export surplus from succeeding in negotiations, and thus inducing the tariff τ n jk (A jk ), rather than failing and inducing the higher tariff τ n jk (A jk /i). This can be thought of as country i's stake in the outcome, and it represents the maximum country i would be willing to pay for a successful settlement. The second component (in brackets) is country i's contribution to the total surplus of all participants, which is split evenly between the importer and the exporter by Nash bargaining.
The second line of (4) is the gross compensation i receives from j for its negotiated tariffs. Note that if i and j are symmetric, then the net compensation is zero, and a bilateral balance is achieved through tariff commitments alone without resort to transfers; otherwise, it could be positive or negative.
Given (4), country i would choose to include good k on its offer list if and only if,
wherew ik denotes the payoff to country i when it sets its tariff on k noncooperatively. The lefthand side of (5) is the gross compensation the importer receives from all participating exporters if the good is negotiated, while the right-hand side measures the cost to the importing country of giving up its noncooperative tariff for the negotiated tariff. For an arbitrary set of participants, it is entirely possible for the compensation to fall short of the cost, in which case the importer would not include the good on its offer list. This might seem odd: why would the importer refuse to negotiate? The reason is that the importer can never extract more than an exporter's stake, which is limited by the fact that the exporter gets a free ride on the negotiations of the other exporters in case of bilateral disagreement. That is, by refusing to conclude its bilateral negotiation with the importer, an exporter can benefit from the bilateral negotiations of the other exporters while not paying compensation, whereas the importer cannot credibly commit to refusing to conclude all of its bilateral negotiations as a way of extracting more compensation from any one exporter. This asymmetry of bargaining power creates a hold up problem. It may be better for the importer to not open negotiations on a product than to negotiate an efficient tariff from such weak bargaining position.
Finally, consider the first stage. Suppose country j includes a good k in R j i anticipating that k ∈ O i . The payoff from this decision is u
On the other hand, if j does not include k in R j i , its payoff is w jk (τ n ik (A ik /j)). Clearly, it is always better to include k than to leave it out, so long as including k does not cause (5) to be violated.
However, if including k does cause (5) to be violated, then j would receivew jk (i.e., it would face i's noncooperative tariff) and would be strictly better off not including k. With this decision rule in hand, it is easy to see that there are multiple equilibria: any set A ik that cannot be increased without violating (5) would be an equilibrium. To resolve this multiplicity, we invoke the principal supplier rule. Suppose that an exporter j may request a good k if and only if all exporters with market share greater than θ j ik also request it. Under this rule, the unique equilibrium is the largest set of consecutive exporters (in descending order of export share) that satisfies (5) . Notice that because (5) is satisfied in equilibrium, importers always include all requested goods on their offer lists. If inefficiency occurs in equilibrium, therefore, it is manifest in a fraction of the exporters (those below a certain export-share threshold) excluding goods from their request lists.
Before moving on to comparative statics, it is worth discussing the generality of the findings so far. We have found that an inefficiency in negotiations may occur because not all exporters participate in negotiations over all goods. Ludema and Mayda (2009) show that any mechanism that satisfies the constraints of MFN, voluntary participation and Pareto efficiency for participants has this feature. Thus, this is not an artifact of the timing of the model or the bilateral or symmetric nature of Nash bargaining. They also show that an optimal mechanism -one that maximizes total world payoffs subject to these constraints -will typically induce the participation of the largest set of consecutive exporters subject to a participation constraint slightly weaker than (5). 8 Thus, the principal supplier rule can be rationalized as a means of selecting the most desirable equilibrium (for the world as a whole) from among the equilibria in our model. 9 8 In an optimal mechanism, each participating exporter pays exactly its stake in each good. Thus, the second term on the lefthand side of (5) vanishes. The reason this term is present in our model is due to the symmetry of the Nash bargaining solution. An optimal mechanism would require an asymmetric bargaining solution in which each country extracts the entire surplus for the goods it imports. That said, in the case of many countries with small export shares, this term vanishes anyways because of the envelope theorem, and thus our model converges to the optimal mechanism.
9 Another possible explanation for why only principal suppliers engage in negotiations might be that there are negotiation costs that increase with the number of items negotiated. This might deter countries from adding to their request lists those goods for which they have small export shares. If such costs were so large as to deter requests from all but the top one or two exporters, then the principal supplier rule would be unnecessary. However, if negotiation costs are small, there would continue to be multiple equilibria, albeit a smaller set of equilibria, and the principal supplier rule would continue to serve as a valuable selection device.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
For now, we drop the product-destination subscript and consider requests for a generic good. Since all exporters above a certain export-share threshold participate, there is a one-to-one relationship between the set of participating exporters and the cumulative export share of participants Θ. Thus, we can write τ n as a function of Θ, instead of A, and find the equilibrium by maximizing Θ subject to (5) . Our focus will be on how the equilibrium is affected by the concentration of exporters.
Let H = j∈C θ j 2 denote the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of all exporters. The HHI ranges from one (the case of a single exporter) to zero (infinitely many exporters with equal market shares). If H = 1, it is easy to show that (5) must hold at Θ = 1, in which case the exporter requests negotiations and the negotiated tariff equals the worldwide efficient tariff. Suppose instead that there are many exporters, each with a relatively small share of the market. In this case, we can replace the lefthand side of (5) by its first-order approximation,
where ω(Θ) = j∈C (dw j /dΘ) and h(Θ) = j∈A(Θ) θ j 2 . The function ω(Θ) measures the marginal benefit to all exporters from a small increase in Θ, while h(Θ) is the HHI of participating exporters.
The intuition behind this expression is as follows. Each participating exporter pays compensation approximately equal to its stake (its effect on the total surplus is second-order). This depends on how much its export surplus is affected by the small increase in Θ (through its effect on tariff) and on how much its participation decision influences Θ. The increase in j 's export surplus due to a small increase in Θ is θ j ω(Θ), which is just j 's share of the marginal benefit to all exporters. The increase in Θ caused by j 's decision to participate is θ j . This gives θ j2 ω(Θ), which is summed over all participating exporters to obtain (6) . If H is sufficiently small, then (6) cannot hold at Θ = 1.
Thus, full participation is not an equilibrium and the negotiated tariff must exceed the worldwide efficient tariff.
This point is illustrated in Figure I , which considers compensation ω(Θ)h(Θ) versus costw i − w i (τ n (Θ)) for two different distributions of export shares, a and b, such that H a > H b . Under mild regularity conditions, these curves intersect at most once (besides the origin). 10 Under distribution . This implies that Θ * is monotonically increasing in H. This is a useful result because, while the set of participants is not observable without the request lists of the countries, H can be readily computed from available trade data.
Political Economy and Free Trade Agreements
The model above is readily adapted to include political economy considerations and free trade agreements. 11 For any country i ∈ C, let MF N i and F T A i partition the set C/i into those countries that trade with i on an MFN basis and those with which i has a free trade agreement, respectively. Let Φ ik denote the share of M ik imported from FTA partners. Welfare becomes
, reflecting that profits are now derived from both FTA exports and MFN exports, while tariff revenue is collected only on MFN imports. We assume the government of country i wishes to maximize k∈Γ v ik , where
That is, the government's payoff is a weighted sum of welfare, domestic profits, own export profits, and the export profits of its FTA partners. The weights λ ik and ψ ik represent the political clout of importing-competing and exporting firms, respectively. We allow λ ik be different from ψ ik . These weights may be due to lobbying as in Grossman and Helpman (1995) , though they are consistent with a variety of political economy models (Baldwin 1987; Helpman 1997 ). The weight φ ik represents country i's concern about the interests of its FTA partners. We have in mind that FTA partners may apply diplomatic pressure on the importing country to preserve the preferential market access of their exporters. While we do not explicitly model this intra-FTA interaction, previous literature (e.g., Limão [2007] ) suggests it is potentially important enough to warrant the inclusion of an functions are sufficiently small. 11 If two or more WTO members are part of a customs union, we treat the group as a single country.
exogenous parameter to capture this effect.
Replacing (1) with (7) as the government objective function does not alter the analysis of the negotiation game; however, the negotiated tariff equation becomes,
reflecting the three additional sources of influence. The negotiated tariff is increasing in
which captures the political influence of import-competing firms 12 and decreasing in 
Cross-country Data
To carry out the cross-country empirical analysis, we gather information for a multitude of importing countries on MFN tariffs, trade, production, and several other variables including import and export elasticities, product differentiation and political organization. Our main dataset contains bound and applied MFN tariff rates along with multilateral and bilateral trade flows for 36 countries, 13 comprising a wide range of income levels, according to the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) 12 The termμ is the elasticity of demand for MFN imports, defined asμ ≡ µ + ξF Φ , where µ is the importing country's elasticity of total import demand, and ξF is the elasticity of export supply from FTA members. Note that µ = µ, when approximated around zero FTA share, as in equation (9). We construct the data set by combining information from COMTRADE and UNCTAD's TRAINS.
Data on the individual members of the European Union were combined, so as to create, in effect, a single country called the EU. This is because the EU maintains a common external tariff and negotiates as a bloc. 14 The main advantage of the 6-digit HS dataset is its very fine level of disaggregation (more than one thousand sectors per country with upwards of four thousand sectors for several of them) and the extensive country coverage. The main disadvantage is that this dataset matches poorly with available production data, obtained from the UNIDO INDSTAT4 (2012) Industrial Statistics.
Production data are necessary for the construction of import penetration, an important factor in controlling for domestic political economy determinants of protection. Some INDSTAT4 data are recorded at the 3-digit ISIC(Rev.3) level, others at the the 4-digit ISIC(Rev.3) level, and many countries report data in some years but not others. 15 To mitigate these problems, we create a hybrid production data set at the 4-digit ISIC(Rev.3) level. We use actual 4-digit data, when reported; in addition, whenever possible, we "fill in" missing 4-digit data with 3-digit data, dividing the latter equally among its corresponding 4-digit subcategories. We then average the 4-digit hybrid production data over the period 1991-2001. In the end, this allows us to retain 26 of our 36 HS countries and about 70% of our HS observations -dropping 10 small, developing countries. 16 Given the data loss and likely measurement error inherent in matching INDSTAT4 production data to 6-digit HS trade data, we construct a second dataset, consisting of 31 countries selected for the completeness of their production data in 1993 at the 4-digit ISIC(Rev.2) level. This dataset is described in Section 4.5. The results turn out to be the same for both datasets. These vary by country and product (but not time) at the 3-digit HS level. 18 Information about the degree of product differentiation is from Rauch (1999) and varies by product, according to the 4-digit SITC classification. The Rauch product classification divides goods into those that are sold on organized exchanges, those for which reference prices can be found in trade journals, and others.
Products in the third category are interpreted as differentiated products. We use concordances to map the elasticity estimates and the Rauch classification to the 6-digit HS codes. which we use as our political organization dummy.
Our dataset has three dimensions: importing country, product and time. 19 The period of time they cover allows us to pay attention to the timing of the negotiation and implementation of tariff agreements. This is important in the empirical analysis given that one might expect tariffs observed 17 Rose's classification is based on formal membership. Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers (2007) argue for including also nonmember participants: colonies, de facto members, and provisional members. For our purposes, it makes little difference, because all of the importing countries in our sample were formal members by the time of the Uruguay Round, as were all but a handful of exporting countries that account for a negligible share of trade. 18 This is a potential problem, because 3-digit HS is not an official classification. The HS classification is built on 6-digit codes, which are aggregated to the 4-digit and 2-digit levels. It turns out, however, that our results are the same whether we use inverse export elasticities at the 2-digit or 3-digit level. Thus, in this paper, we use the 3-digit HS elasticities as estimated by Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006). 19 Product categories are 6-digit HS codes. We shall use the terms products, goods, commodities, and sectors interchangeably to refer to these product categories. We use the term "industry" to refer to a higher level of aggregation, namely, HS sections.
during the implementation period to be affected more by conditions prevailing during the negotiation period than by contemporaneous conditions. Thus, our main dependent variable will be the MFN tariff rate averaged over 1995-2000, while the independent variables are drawn from 1993, which was the final and most critical year of the Uruguay Round negotiations. With the time dimension collapsed in this way, our estimation exploits cross-commodity and cross-country variation.
In most of our specifications, the MFN tariffs we consider are ad valorem applied rates, averaged over several years. We do not consider specific tariffs or non-tariff barriers, although previous work on the U.S. (Ludema and Mayda 2009) obtained similar results for specific tariffs and found no effect of the HHI on non-tariff barriers (in 1983), consistent with the latter being largely unconstrained by MFN. 20 We also do not focus on bound rates, except as a robustness check. In practice, the difference between the applied and bound tariff rates in developed countries is quite small, though the gaps can be large for developing countries. Our choice to use applied is based on two sets of considerations. First, our theory is about applied rates, the rates that actually apply to trade flows at any point in time. Bound rates are a tool that countries use to influence the future path of applied rates. 21 Empirically, Bacchetta and Piermartini (2011) show that tariff bindings restrain applied rates even when gaps exist, indicating that negotiations over bound tariffs are instrumental in determining applied rates. However, rather than take a stand on the functional relationship by which bound rates affect applied rates, we prefer to focus on the applied rates themselves. 22 Second, even when bound rates are binding on applied rates, there is an advantage to using applied rates, due to staging. Applied tariffs are not immediately subject to the bound rates negotiated in a Round but are phased-in in stages, with more politically sensitive products phased-in as late as possible.
Thus, two products with the same bound tariff rate will have different average applied rates if they are phased in at different times. This variation would be lost if we used only final bound rates.
Finally, we note that, as a practical matter, the use of bound rates as the dependent variable has 20 NTBs have been shown to add a significant amount to import protection in some countries and to interact with tariffs (Limão and Tovar 2011). Future work should try to understand the role of terms of trade in the presence of these alternative instruments. 21 There is a literature devoted to why this particular tool is used in negotiations and why gaps between the bound and applied rates may exist, but the theories involve considerations beyond the scope of this paper. Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010), and Beshkar, Bond and Rho (2012) are representative of models that introduce uncertainty along with transaction costs, such as private information or complexity costs, to explain binding overhang. 22 Another way of stating this point is to note that the bound rate is composed of the applied rate and overhang. Given that our theory is about applied rates, using bound rates is effectively introducing an omitted variable (overhang) that could bias our estimates.
no effect on the results, as we show in our robustness checks in section 4.4. Summary statistics of applied and bound tariff rates, as well as additional variables used in the empirical analysis, are presented in Table A .1.
Empirical Analysis

Empirical strategy
In the empirical analysis, we use a specification that is closely related to the theoretical model. Note that the negotiated tariff in equation (8) is equal to 1 (free trade) if there is full participation, no political pressure and negligible FTA share. Taking a first-order Taylor approximation of (8) around this point, and adding an error term, we obtain the following estimating equation for product k and importing country i:
The first challenge is to measure 1/ξ ik , the inverse elasticity of foreign export supply of product k to country i, which captures country i's market power. Finding an accurate measure has long been a problem in the international trade literature. Although the elasticity estimates of Broda,
Greenfield and Weinstein (2006) are the most comprehensive available in terms of country and product coverage, they are very imprecise. We deal with this issue in two different ways. One is to follow Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008) and create a categorical variable, "High inverse export elasticity" (HIEE), which is equal to 1 if the inverse export elasticity estimate is in the top two thirds of all products' estimates within the same country and zero otherwise. The second approach is to use proxy measures that are both theoretically plausible determinants of market power and are also correlated with the inverse elasticity estimates. The proxies we consider are the log of GDP, which varies by country, and the Rauch classification, which varies by product. To justify using the log of GDP, we note that textbook treatments of optimal tariffs attribute market power to large countries and indeed, in the data (see footnote 23 below), countries with larger GDP face lower export elasticities on average. As for the Rauch classification, we note that, in general, the extent to which a trade barrier interposed between a buyer and a seller will induce the seller to lower its price depends on how easy it is for the seller to match with an alternative buyer. Rauch (1999) argues that product differentiation interferes with matching in international markets and finds evidence of this in bilateral trade flows. Thus we expect that products classified as differentiated by the Rauch classification should have lower export elasticities (i.e., higher importer market power) than homogenous products. This too is borne out in the data, as the export supply elasticity estimates are much lower for products classified as differentiated. 23 The second challenge is to measure Θ ik , which captures how much of the terms-of-trade effect of the tariff is internalized by the participants in negotiations over each product. In particular, Θ ik measures country i's imports from participants in GATT/WTO negotiations over product k as a fraction of its imports from all countries that are entitled to MFN treatment and are not its FTA partners. While we do not observe the set of participants, our theory tells us that Θ ik should be positively related to the HHI. In our calculation of the HHI, we must account for the presence of non-GATT countries that receive MFN treatment and exclude each importing country's FTA partners and other countries that do not receive MFN treatment. Thus, we measure the HHI as:
where MF N i is the set of all countries that are granted MFN treatment by importing country i, excluding i's FTA partners, while GAT T i is the subset of MF N i consisting of members of the WTO (these countries are therefore potential participants in the multilateral negotiations). We have data on MFN treatment only for the United States, which grants MFN treatment to all but a few, small, isolated countries. We therefore exclude these same countries from MF N i for all countries in our sample. 24 M j ik is the value of importing country i's imports of product k from country j. Thus the 23 Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008) investigate the correlation between inverse export elasticity and several market power variables, including log GDP, the Rauch index and the importing country's share of world imports by product, for a group of non-WTO countries. They find the same results for log GDP and the Rauch index as we do for WTO countries. We find a positive correlation between HIEE and the indicator of product differentiation. We also estimate a positive correlation between the inverse export elasticity and log GDP, controlling for product fixed effects, although this correlation is less robust. Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008) also find that an importing country's share of world imports is correlated with the inverse export elasticity by product (although this result does not survive controlling for log GDP). We find no such correlation among WTO countries, thus we do not use the importing country's share of world imports as a proxy of market power. 24 During this period, the only countries that were not granted MFN treatment by the United States were Afghanistan, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Iran, Vietnam, Serbia and Montenegro. As discussed in section 4.4, we also consider a specification in which all non-GATT countries are considered as non-MFN for all importers, with no effect on the results.
HHI so defined equals the sum of squared shares of exports to importing country i by all potential (non-FTA) participants in multilateral negotiations.
In addition to the key elements discussed above, we introduce controls for the effects of political economy and FTAs. We do this in a sequence of specifications marked by increasing reliance on our political economy measures. In the first specification, we treat the political economy terms as unobserved and account for them with industry fixed effects. This has the advantage of allowing us to use our full sample of countries. In the second specification, we attempt to capture domestic political pressure without a direct measure of political organization, by assuming λ ik is equal to an industry dummy -which we interact with X i ik /M ik µ ik , where X i ik (domestic sales) is measured as value-added minus exports -and we also set ψ ik = 0. 25 In the third specification, we take a structural approach. Following Goldberg and Maggi (1999), we define the domestic political economy term as λ ik = (γ + δ · P O ik ), where the political organization dummy P O ik is equal to 1 if a trade association is present in country i and sector k and zero otherwise. Again, this is interacted with X i ik /M ik µ ik . We expect δ > 0, γ < 0 and γ + δ > 0, as organized domestic producers prefer higher home tariffs on goods they produce and lower tariffs on goods they consume; however, γ may equal zero if lobbying groups are a negligible share of the voting population. Symmetrically, we define the foreign political economy term ψ jk = δ * · P O jk . 26 We expect δ * < 0, as organized foreign producers prefer lower home tariffs on the goods they export. 27 In all specifications we include country fixed effects and control for the final term in (9) by including the interaction of the FTA share of imports with the inverse import demand elasticity. Finally, we use multi-way clustering as discussed in detail below.
Estimation based on the 6-digit HS data set
We begin our analysis by investigating the role of country size. Ludema and Mayda (2009) regress U.S. tariffs on the HHI ignoring cross-sector variation in market power, thus producing an estimate 25 In other words, we assume that export firms have no political clout. This accords with broad evidence, summarized in Rodrik (1995) , that trade regimes tend to be biased toward import-competing producers, as well as recent findings of import-competing bias in the U.S. by Ludema, Mayda and Mishra (2012). 26 Our political organization dummy varies by country and sector but not between import-competing and exporting firms in the same sector: a sector in a given country is either politically organized or not. However, the theory allows import-competing and exporting firms to have different political clout. Empirically, we reconcile this by allowing political organization to have a different effect on the home tariff than it has on the foreign tariff, i.e., δ = δ * . 27 Organized foreign producers are unaffected by home tariffs on goods they do not produce under the maintained assumption of segmented markets.
of an average HHI effect across products. In this section, we conduct a similar exercise for each importing country in our sample to see if this effect depends on market size. If larger countries have greater market power on average, we should expect their tariff schedules to be more sensitive to variation in the market share of participants and in particular more negatively related to the HHI. To test this, we estimate country-specific regressions of the average MFN tariff rate (over the years 1995-2000) on the 1993 HHI. 28 For each of these regressions, we consider the estimated coefficient on the HHI -which is indeed negative for most countries in the sample -and plot it against the country's log GDP ( Figure II) . We estimate the fitted regression line with weighted least squares (WLS) using as weights the inverse of the variance of the HHI coefficients. The slope of the regression line is negative -0.52 (robust standard error of 0.42), which is consistent with the proposition that the MFN free-rider problem (as evidenced by a negative average effect of the HHI on the tariff) is more severe for larger countries.
The coefficients on the HHI for many developing countries in the sample are not statistically significant, whereas OECD countries tend to have negative and significant coefficients. Since the country-specific regressions implicitly assume that each country's market power for a product equals its average market power, the result for developing countries is consistent with the supposition that these countries have little market power on average. However, it could also be that the theory does not apply to developing countries. To find out, we must exploit the cross-product heterogeneity in market power that is present in our data. While a developing country may have little market power on average, the tariffs it imposes on products where it does have market power should be negatively and significantly related to the HHI if our theory is correct.
We next estimate regressions with data pooled across countries. Incorporating the considerations of Section 4.1, we derive the following specification:
where τ ik − 1 is the ad-valorem MFN tariff rate on product k of importing country i averaged over the years 1995-2000, H ik and Φ ik are country i's HHI and FTA import share for product k in 1993, 28 These regressions use an instrumental variable for the HHI, as we do in the pooled regressions described below.
They also control for the 1993 FTA market share divided by the import demand elasticity and HS section dummy variables.
MP ik and µ ik are market power and import demand elasticity in country i for product k, and α i is a country fixed effect. The term Z ik captures political economy controls and varies by specification.
Given that MP ik and H ik serve as proxies for the true inverse export supply elasticity and the market share of participants, respectively, we should not expect the estimated coefficients of MP ik and MP ik · H ik to be 1 and −1, respectively, as in equation (9). Nevertheless, the theoretical model pins down expected signs. First, we expect β 1 > 0, as this captures the effect of the importing country's market power when H ik = 0, which is when free riding is complete and the negotiated tariff is equal to the non-cooperative optimal tariff. As in the optimum tariff theory, the higher is country i's market power in sector k, the higher is the tariff it sets. Second, we expect the effect of market power to decrease as the HHI increases, i.e., β 2 < 0, as the HHI interacted with market power is intended to capture the internalization of terms of trade effects through negotiations. At the same time a negative β 2 implies that the effect of the HHI on tariffs is negative in sectors where the importing country has high market power, which is consistent with the MFN free rider problem. By the same token, we expect β 3 to be zero or slightly negative, since it captures the effect of the HHI when MP ik = 0, i.e. zero or low market power. The coefficient on the FTA share is theoretically ambiguous. A negative coefficient would indicate that the importing country does not fully internalize the effect of its tariff on its FTA partners (i.e., φ < 1), while the opposite interpretation is true for a positive coefficient. Table I shows the results of estimating equation (11) on MFN applied tariffs. The first four columns contain estimates using the Rauch proxy for market power. Specifically, the categorical variable Diff is equal to 1 if the product is differentiated and zero otherwise. Columns (5)- (8) use
HIEE as the measure of market power. For each market power measure, the first two columns are based on our first specification (using OLS and IV, respectively), while the remaining two columns correspond to the second and third specifications discussed above (using IV alone). Overall the results are strongly in line with the theory: a country's MFN tariff is increasing in its market power in the absence of internalization, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient β 1 . This market power effect is diminishing in the HHI, as indicated by the negative and significant β 2 . The direct effect of the HHI, β 3 , is small and almost always insignificant. The FTA share is positive and significant in the regressions with industry fixed effects but negative and insignificant in the specifications with other political economy controls. In columns (4) and (8), the direct effect of the inverse import penetration is small and insignificant, suggesting that lobbying groups are a negligible share of the voting population; however, the effect of domestic political organization interacted with the inverse import penetration ratio is positive and significant, consistent with Goldberg and Maggi (1999). The effect of foreign political organization is negative, as the theory predicts, and significant under the HIEE measure.
In Table I , columns (1) and (5) contain OLS estimates, while the remaining columns address the issue of potential endogeneity of the HHI and HIEE using an IV approach. 29 The most obvious sources of endogeneity for the HHI would tend to bias toward zero our estimates of a negative effect of the HHI for instances of high market power. This is because they imply a positive correlation between the tariff and the HHI. For example, it is likely that a market with few foreign suppliers (and thus high HHI) is also less competitive domestically. In this case, the government might use the tariff as a second-best instrument for correcting the domestic distortion of monopolistic pricing.
It is also likely that concentrated domestic producers wield disproportionate political influence and therefore push for high tariffs. 30 Another possibility is reverse causality. A higher tariff rate in country i may affect the exporting countries' market shares in i and thereby influence i's HHI. This cannot occur in our theoretical model, which assumes the shares to be independent of prices, but it might be true in the data if the export supply elasticities differ across exporting countries. Even then, for the tariff to influence the HHI substantially in one direction or the other, the export supply elasticities would have to be systematically related to export shares. The most likely scenario along these lines is that a high tariff weeds out the smaller foreign suppliers (i.e., the adjustment occurs at the extensive margin), in which case there would be a positive effect of the tariff on the HHI.
Notwithstanding the likely biases toward zero mentioned above, we take a conservative approach and estimate IV specifications. To instrument for H ik , we find for each country i the three countries in our sample with the corresponding HHI most highly correlated with that of i and use their average as an instrument. The reason for averaging across three countries is to avoid data loss resulting from cross-country variation in the number of observations. Using foreign averages as instruments is particularly appropriate when endogeneity is caused by domestic distortions or domestic political 29 We do not instrument for the Rauch measure of market power, as it does not vary by country. 30 This effect may be countered if foreign producers are also concentrated and push for lower home tariffs. In regressions (4) and (8), we control for both foreign and domestic political pressure with our political organization variables.
economy determinants of a country's MFN tariffs -not captured by variables in our specificationwhich are correlated with our main variables. 31 For the HIEE variable, we use an instrument which is similarly constructed. The results of the IV regressions are qualitatively the same as in the OLS regressions, although the effect of market power and the interaction between market power and the HHI are larger in absolute value in the IV estimates. The first stages of our IV estimates are strong as evidenced by the high F-values of the excluded instruments presented in Table I .
Finally, we note that our estimates use clustered robust standard errors to address heteroskedasticity and possible correlation of observations within country and market-power clusters. Our measures of market power are more aggregated than our measure of tariffs, and since we want to estimate the effect of market power, we should cluster accordingly. Furthermore, within-country correlation of errors could be present, even though we include country fixed effects (and thus exploit only within-country variation to obtain our estimates). This would occur, for example, if underlying 
Quantification
A useful way to gauge the magnitude of our results is to consider some counterfactual comparisons.
The first counterfactual is to set the HHI equal to zero for all products and countries, thereby eliminating the internalization of terms of trade effects in our model. This produces estimates of what the tariffs would be in the absence of negotiations (the noncooperative tariff). The second counterfactual is to increase each HHI to the point where internalization completely offsets the effect of importer market power, i.e., β 1 + β 2 H = 0, or H = −β 1 /β 2 . We call the resulting tariff the "potential" tariff, as it represents the lowest tariff achievable through internalization (i.e., no MFN free riding). In between these two extremes is the actual HHI, which corresponds to partial 31 They also address the reverse causality operating through the extensive margin discussed above, under our maintained assumption of segmented markets. 32 The standards errors are similar when we use country clusters alone and much smaller when we use robust standard errors without clustering.
internalization of terms-of-trade effects and results in the negotiated tariff predicted by our empirical model.
We perform these calculations using our full IV specifications (4) and (8) . 33 We compare, for each 6-digit product, the negotiated and potential tariffs, respectively, with the noncooperative tariff. We take the average of these differences across products and countries and divide it by the average noncooperative tariff. The results are reported in Table II . Using the average over all countries and products, we find that the negotiated tariff is lower than the noncooperative level by about 22% for the Rauch measure and 27% for the HIEE measure. The potential tariff reductions are 30% and 31%, respectively. Thus, depending on the measure, between 75% and 88% of all the potential terms-of-trade-driven tariff liberalization has been realized through negotiations. The remaining 12% to 25% is unrealized because of the MFN free rider problem.
An important caveat here is that we are only measuring negotiated and potential terms-oftrade-driven tariff liberalization. Liberalization may also occur because of diminishing domestic motives for protection. Moreover, by giving governments a credible commitment device vis-a-vis domestic political actors, GATT/WTO negotiations may be instrumental in reducing tariffs along this dimension (see, e.g., Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998). These considerations are beyond the scope of our model, so we cannot estimate the potential for this type of liberalization. We can, however, roughly account for how much of the post-war liberalization of our sample countries is due to the internalization of terms-of-trade effects through GATT/WTO negotiations and how much is due to domestic factors. While our data cover only the 1990s, Clemens and Williamson (2004) present historical data on applied tariffs, measured as tariff revenue divided by dutiable imports, for 35 countries of which 24 overlap with our sample. 34 They put the simple average tariff across these 24 countries at 13.9% in 1945. To construct a comparable measure of our predicted tariffs, we compute the trade-weighted average negotiated and noncooperative tariffs for each country, using as trade weights import shares from 1993, and take the simple average across the same 24 countries.
Using the HIEE measure of market power, we find an average noncooperative tariff of 11.3% and an average negotiated tariff of 8.5%. Thus, we conclude that of the 5.4 percentage points drop in 33 We set β3 = 0 as this term is not significantly different from zero. 34 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, India, Japan, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Peru, Thailand, United States and 9 members of the EU -Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
average tariffs between the 1945 actual and the 1995-2000 negotiated levels, 52% may be attributed to the internalization of terms-of-trade effects according to our model estimates. The remainder may be attributed to diminishing unilateral motives for protection. (between 65 and 78 percent), which is due to the fact that developing countries face higher HHIs on average (0.61 versus 0.5) and thus confront less of a free rider problem in negotiations.
Looking at HS sections, the two measures of market power give different results but agree on the main points: food, minerals and other raw materials are predicted to experience the smallest tariff reductions, while advanced manufacturing, such as instruments, arms, and transport equipment are predicted to experience the largest. The ranking is driven by a combination of differences in HHI, market power and noncooperative tariff levels. For example, instruments (Section XVIII) and footwear (Section XII) have approximately the same levels of product differentiation and export elasticity; however, footwear has a much lower HHI (0.4 compared to 0.7 for instruments) leading to far lower internalization. The lower HHI in footwear also explains why so little of the sector's potential tariff liberalization has been realized.
The foregoing results cast light on a long-running debate between developed and developing countries over the fairness of the WTO. Developing countries charge that the WTO serves mainly the export interests of developed countries, citing the relative lack of liberalization on products predominantly exported by developing countries. This critique is embodied in Part IV of the GATT, which calls on developed countries to reduce tariffs on products of interest to developing countries and exempts developing countries from reciprocity (though neither provision is binding).
Developed countries counter that their tariffs are far lower on average and charge that developing countries free ride on this openness via MFN. Developed countries do have lower average tariffs but this is largely because of lower unilateral motives, as we have shown. In fact, they liberalize less relative to potential, because they face lower HHIs on the goods they import and hence face more free riding. At the same time, developed countries tend to export advanced manufactures, which are relatively concentrated (and thus unencumbered by the MFN free rider problem) and high in market power, leading to successful negotiated liberalization. The manufactured exports of developing countries, such as footwear, textiles and miscellaneous manufactures, have relatively high potential for negotiated liberalization, but because they are produced by so many small countries, this potential goes unrealized. The other major class of developing-country exports are agricultural products and raw materials, which are low-liberalization products, mainly because of low estimated levels of market power. To quantify this product mix effect, we consider the average improvement in market access to the United States for a developing versus a developed country in our sample.
For each exporting country i and product k, we use the U.S. percentage tariff reduction (i.e., the predicted negotiated tariff relative to the predicted noncooperative tariff), weighted by U.S. imports of k from i as a share of U.S. total imports from i, to create an exporter-specific weighted average US tariff reduction across products. This can be thought of as the expected U.S. tariff reduction faced by a randomly chosen export of country i. Using the HIIE measure, this is 26% for the average developed country in our sample, compared to 11% for the average developing country -the difference being driven entirely by product mix in relation to the degree of terms of trade internalization.
Thus, the lack of progress in cutting tariffs on developing-country exports is not so much a question of fairness of negotiations but of their efficiency; and the solution does not lie in exempting developing countries from reciprocity but attracting them to it. One solution that does not require a change in WTO rules is to increase the concentration of developing-country exports. This is already occurring because of China's entry into the WTO and its rising dominance in manufacturing exports.
It could also be accomplished by the formation of customs unions. We find, for example, that the average tariff reduction received by the EU from the U.S. is 31%, whereas if the EU were to break apart, the resulting decrease in HHIs of the goods Europe exports would cause the figure to fall to 21%. Thus, roughly one third of the terms-of-trade driven improvement in market access that EU enjoys in the U.S. market is due to the EU customs union.
Robustness Checks
We have shown that the applied MFN tariffs of WTO members are increasing in market power and that this effect is mitigated by high HHI, as implied by the theory. In this section, we test the robustness of this conclusion. Our first set of robustness checks involves adding control variables suggested by extensions of our theory.
1) Reciprocity in Tariffs.
In the model of Section 2, countries set tariffs to achieve Pareto efficiency for participants and use international transfers to allocate the gains. However, if we think of transfers as representing non-market-access concessions, we must confront the possibility that these concessions are costly to make, and thus countries might try to avoid transfers by making more balanced tariff concessions. To see this, recall that equation (4) gives the net compensation country i must pay to j under costless transfers. This can be seen as a measure of the balance of negotiated tariff concessions between i and j. If it equals zero, it means that the negotiated tariffs achieve balance, so that no actual transfers are necessary. However, if this expression is positive, it means that country i has a deficit in tariff concessions with, and thus must make a transfer to, country j. If transfers are costly, country i may prefer to cut its tariffs toward j as a way to reduce its deficit, thus deviating from Pareto efficiency for participants (and hence equation (8)). 35 In the appendix, we show that, if the transfer cost is small, we can capture this effect on the tariff with a single term MP ik · B ik , where B ik is the export share in country i of participating exporters of good k with which i has a deficit in the balance of negotiated tariff concessions. The larger is this term, the greater is the payoff to country i in terms of deficit reduction from a marginal decrease in its tariff on good k, and thus the lower will be the negotiated tariff. To implement this in the data, we first define r ij as the bilateral deficit ratio (i's compensation to j relative to j 's compensation to i) and show,
where M mfn jk is the volume of j 's MFN imports of good k. This equation is intuitive. On each good it requests from j, country i pays compensation approximately equal to its stake in the negotiations, which depends on how much i's presence at the bargaining table improves its terms of trade, θ i jk dp * jk /dΘ jk , multiplied by its level of exports of k to j, θ i jk M mfn jk . Likewise, on each good it imports from j, country i receives compensation approximately equal to j 's stake (in the denominator).
Finally, we proxy B ik with the export-weighted average deficit ratio, B * ik ≡ j∈C θ j ik r ij . 36 In Table III , which follows the same format as Table I , this term is negative and significant in most specifications. This is consistent with the theory and does not affect the results on our main variables of interest.
2) Non-GATT exporters. Our measure of the HHI includes non-GATT countries receiving MFN treatment (e.g., China) in the denominator but excludes them from the numerator, because they are not potential participants. The higher the non-GATT market share, the lower is our measure of the HHI. By controlling for the non-GATT market share, we can check whether the negative impact of the HHI on the tariff for high market power products is mostly driven by countries that cannot participate in negotiations (because they are not GATT/WTO members) as opposed to being driven by GATT/WTO members that decide not to participate. Table III shows that, for the most part, this control variable is itself statistically insignificant and has little effect on our main findings. In addition to this specification, we also consider the effect of both controlling for non-GATT market share and removing non-GATT countries from the denominator of the HHI.
The results (not shown) are unchanged. Table IV contains a collection of other robustness checks, motivated by a variety of concerns. For the sake of brevity, and to be consistent across specifications, 37 we present only two specifications for each one, namely the IV specifications with country and HS section fixed effects (corresponding to columns to (2) and (6) in Tables I and III). 3) A Liberal Definition of FTA. In Tables I -III, we account for FTAs if they were notified under GATT Article 24 and in force in 1993. This is a conservative definition, in that it does not include preferential agreements notified under the Enabling Clause -as they do not require tariffs to be completely eliminated on intra-FTA trade -or FTAs that came into force shortly after the Uruguay Round negotiations. Columns (1) and (2) of Table IV use a liberal definition of FTAs, which includes all FTAs notified to the WTO under either rule and in force in 1996. 38 The results 36 To compute rij we use MP jk in place of dp * jk /dΘ jk . 37 For several non-WTO countries, we do not have production data necessary to estimate the structural specification. 38 The preferential agreements added under the liberal definition are: MERCOSUR, NAFTA, CAN, AFTA, CACM, do not change appreciably, although the FTA share variable becomes positive and significant at the 1% level.
4) The Big Three. The US, the EU, and Japan are by far the three largest countries in our sample and have also been among the most active participants in GATT negotiations since its inception. We wish to confirm that our empirical results hold for these countries and are not driven by the smaller or less developed ones. Columns (3) and (4) of Table IV show the results of restricting our sample to the US, the EU, and Japan. The results are very much in line with those of the full sample. A minor difference is that the direct effect of market power is smaller in absolute terms than in the full sample, which probably reflects the lower and less variable tariffs of these countries (the mean and standard deviation are 4.7% and 6.8, respectively, for the US, the EU, and Japan, compared to 12.2% and 12.8 for the full sample). Relative to average tariffs, the direct effect of market power is about the same, and the effect of the interaction with the HHI is more than double that of the full sample.
5) Non-GATT importers.
To this point, we have confined our attention to a sample of GATT countries in order to capture the effect of GATT negotiations on MFN tariffs. However, there might be alternative theories that give rise to the empirical results we have shown but which have nothing to do with GATT negotiations. One way to check that indeed GATT negotiations are driving our results is to estimate our model on a sample of non-GATT importing countries.
We do this using the data on non-GATT countries found in Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008).
We borrow tariff rates and elasticities from that paper, which we aggregate to match the levels of aggregation in our analysis of the GATT sample, and we construct the HHI and FTA shares using the WITS trade data. Columns (5) and (6) of Table IV show the results. Consistent with Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008), we find that the effect of market power is positive and significant.
However, in line with our theory of multilateral negotiations, we find no significant effect of the HHI or its interaction with market power. 6) Bound tariffs. Technically, countries negotiate over bound tariffs rather than applied tariffs, and sometimes the gaps between the two rates can be large, particularly in developing countries.
Columns (7) and (8) of Table IV show the results of estimating the regressions with MFN bound Costa Rica-Mexico, Colombia-Mexico, EU-Turkey, EU-Bulgaria, EU-Czech Republic, EU-Hungary, EU-Poland, EURomania, and EU-Slovakia. Austria, Findland and Sweden are included as part of the EU under both conservative and liberal definitions.
tariffs as the dependent variable. Qualitatively, the results are unchanged from the applied tariff regressions, though β 1 and β 2 are consistently greater in absolute value, and β 3 is positive and significant. These differences appear to be driven by instances in which the bound and applied rates are vastly different. When we restrict the sample to include only observations for which the bound tariff is no more than 30 percentage points above the applied tariff, the coefficient estimates (not shown) match those of Table I quite closely. Moreover, (also not shown) we have also estimated our applied rate regressions, dividing the sample between positive and non-positive overhang, and obtain very similar results between the two subsamples. Most gradualism models assume that the same group of countries meet round after round but are constrained on how far they can reduce their tariffs in any one round, usually due to limited enforceability (see, Bagwell and Staiger [2002] Ch. 6, for review). Such models tend to be very involved, and developing one for our setting is well outside the scope of this paper. However, in the spirit of such models, Ludema and Mayda (2009) propose a first-order difference equation,
), where b < 1 and τ n t is the negotiated tariff in our theoretical model. This equation thus embeds our model within a process of gradual liberalization. We can estimate this model with the following equation:
is the average MFN tariff from 1989-1993, which pre-dated the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and ∆τ k is the difference between the post-Uruguay and pre-Uruguay tariffs. The reason we only exploit cross-product variation in the above equation is that data on pre-Uruguay tariffs are readily available for the U.S. (Feenstra, Romalis and Schott 2002). Thus, Table IV , columns (9) and (10), show the results of estimating this equation for the U.S., instrumenting for the HHI and MP. We find a negative and significant coefficient β 2 for both measures of market power, indicating that products with high market power and high HHI experienced larger tariff reductions in the Uruguay Round. The coefficient on τ pre k is negative and significant, which we take as evidence of a tariff liberalization process that converges to the long-run equilibrium of our model.
Estimation based on the 4-digit ISIC data set
In this section, we estimate our model on the second dataset, consisting of 25 countries selected for the completeness of their production data in 1993 at the 4-digit ISIC(Rev. The drawback is that a few highly protected tariff lines within a sector can seriously affect the average. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we restrict our sample to tariff averages less than 50% ad valorem. 41 Using this dataset, we follow the same steps as in the previous section, use the same information from secondary sources and estimate the same specifications. 42 We first investigate the role of country size. We estimate country-specific regressions of the av- . 41 This restriction amounts to less than 5% of our observations. Our main results are not sensitive to this threshold, though overall fit diminishes if outliers are not excluded. 42 Since 4-digit ISIC(Rev.2) is more aggregated than 3-digit HS and 4-digit SITC, concording the data to ISIC(Rev.2) required some care. To concord the elasticities, we took the median of the 3-digit HS values within each 4-digit ISIC(Rev.2). We used the median, rather than the mean, to diminish the effect of outliers, as the elasticity estimates have large standard errors. For the Rauch classification, we created a continuous measure (Diffshare) equal to the share of the 4-digit SITC codes within each 4-digit ISIC(Rev.2) category that were classified as differentiated according to Rauch's liberal definition. Note that our industry dummies are now defined by 3-digit ISIC(Rev.2) codes.
on the HHI is indeed negative for most countries in the sample. It is plotted against the country's log GDP in Figure III . The slope of the fitted line, estimated using WLS, is negative and equal to -1.14 (with robust standard error of 0.17), which is larger in absolute value and more precisely estimated than in the HS6 case. The reason for this difference may be the country sample, which contains fewer very small countries or poor countries. Nonetheless, the regression confirms that the negative impact of the HHI on the MFN tariff rate is more pronounced for larger countries.
We next estimate the model pooling the data across countries. The specification we use is equation (11) . The main difference between this and HS6 regressions is that the Rauch proxy for market power used in the ISIC(Rev.2) regressions is Diffshare, which is the share of the 4-digit SITC products within each 4-digit ISIC(Rev.2) category that are classified as differentiated. To conclude, we believe we have found remarkably robust evidence -in both datasets -that the MFN tariffs of WTO countries are driven by terms-of-trade considerations and that the degree of success in reducing tariffs through negotiations depends on the concentration of exporters in combination with market power in a manner consistent with our theory. Our results are even stronger in light of the following consideration. Participants in the negotiations may try to constrain the MFN externality via reciprocity and their determination to do so might be greater when the participation problem is more severe (i.e., the HHI is low). This would imply that when the HHI is low (and our model predicts that the tariff should be high, assuming high market power), endogenous mitigation of the MFN externality should increase the internalization of terms of trade effects, thereby lowering the tariff relative to our prediction. In other words, the presence of this effect should bias the coefficient on the interaction towards zero.
43 Comparing this with the FTA share results in the HS6 regressions, we find mixed results on the building-blockstumbling-block question, as in the existing literature. This could be due to different country samples or different levels of aggregation. It is interesting to note that Limão (2006) finds a stumbling-block effect using HS6 data, while Estevadeordal, Freund and Ornelas (2008) find a building block effect using 4-digit ISIC(Rev.2) data.
Conclusion
The main findings of this paper are twofold. These findings have broad implications. First, the evidence that terms-of-trade effects drive trade agreements suggests that the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination at the heart of the WTO are indeed valuable and the attempts of economists and legal scholars to understand the WTO in these terms are well founded. Second, the evidence on the pervasiveness of the MFN free rider problem suggests that the principle of nondiscrimination is not without drawbacks. Indeed, we estimate that 12 to 25 percent of potential liberalization on average goes unrealized, and most of this falls on the exports of developing countries due to their low-concentration product mix. Therefore, mitigating the MFN free rider problem should be a priority for the WTO. Our model suggests that the key is to increase participation, either by isolating free riders from the benefits of liberalization or by increasing exporter concentration. Indeed, the principal supplier rule, reciprocity, the use of formula negotiations, the single undertaking, plurilateral agreements, and various forms of regionalism can all be seen as addressing participation by one or both of these means. More study is required to determine what effects these approaches have had and to suggest preferable alternatives.
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The GATT principle of reciprocity is usually taken to mean a symmetric exchange of market access.
The model of Section 2 deviates from this notion in two ways. The first has to do with the symmetry of reciprocity: we assume that an exporter not requesting negotiations on a particular product, or requesting negotiations but failing to reach agreement with the importer, is not required to reciprocate tariff reductions that the importer subsequently makes on that product. The second has to do with its form: we assume reciprocity is not restricted to tariffs but can include costless transfers. In this appendix, we show that it is possible to relax these assumptions substantially without altering the conclusions of our theory.
1)
Requiring partial reciprocity from free riders. We begin our base model and add the assumption that any exporter j that does not agree to a compensation schedule with importer i for good k must still pay a minimum compensation equal toĉ 
Thus, the negotiated tariff continues to be increasing in the market power of the importer, so long as there is less-than-full participation, i.e., 1 − Θ A ik > 0, and less-than-full reciprocity from nonparticipants, i.e., 1 − ρ > 0. We can interpret the term
as the "effective" market power of the importer. As long as it is positive, there is no substantive change in the negotiated tariff equation, and in particular, there is no change in our estimating equations, as 1 − ρ gets absorbed into the parameters β 1 , β 2 and β 3 .
It remains to show how partial reciprocity affects participation decisions. The critical constraint that must be satisfied by any set participants A ik is (5), which ensures that each requested good is included in the importer's offer list. Under partial reciprocity this becomes,
Note that to obtain (14) we have used the assumption that if the importer does not include k in its offer list, it can nevertheless obtain minimum reciprocal compensation by unilaterally lowering its tariff. Thus, w ik refers to the importer's payoff from its noncooperative tariff using effective rather than true market power. Again equation (14) is nearly identical to (5), and thus all the qualitative conclusions regarding the principal supplier rule and the effect of H remain changed.
Further, it is interesting to note that if we hold effective market power constant while increasing ρ, it becomes more difficult to satisfy (14) . That is, greater reciprocity actually makes it harder to obtain participation ceterus parabis. The intuition is that the more the importer can rely on reciprocity from non-participants to obtain compensation for its tariff reductions, the less it needs participation.
2) Costly bilateral transfers. Equation (4) in the main text gives the expression for the net compensation country i must pay to j under the assumption that transfers are costless. We define the bilateral compensation ratio (i.e., i's compensation paid to j relative to j 's compensation paid to i) as,
If r ij = 1, then equilibrium tariff reductions alone achieve a balance of concessions between countries i and j, whereas if r ij > 1 (< 1), country i is in deficit (surplus) in terms of tariff concessions with j and must make (receive) transfers to achieve balance. If we assume that bilateral transfers are costly (or equivalently, that institutional considerations make running a deficit in tariff concessions costly), this is likely to affect tariff negotiations in a number of ways. First, to reduce the deficit, a country i might request fewer goods of j. This would alter the set of participants over each good.
Second, for any given set of participants, the negotiated tariff would also be affected. If r ij > 1, then on each good i imports from j, i should choose a lower tariff as a means of reducing its net transfer to j, while if r ij < 1, j would offer less generous a compensation schedule to reduce its net transfer to i, thereby causing i to choose a higher negotiated tariff.
To work out all of the effects of costly transfers in our model -simultaneously determining the bilateral compensation ratios, the sets of participants and the negotiated tariffs -would be a major undertaking. We can take a simple, yet significant, step in the right direction by considering an initial situation of costless transfers and examining the effect of adding a small transfer cost. This allows us to hold constant the deficit-surplus positions and the identities of the participants over each good (as these are discrete choices), and focus on marginal changes in the negotiated tariffs.
Again using the base model (ρ equal to zero), we assume an iceberg transfer cost of κ > 1, such that it costs a country κ dollars to send one dollar of transfer to another country. Consider an importer i negotiating with a set of participants A ik . Every exporter j ∈ A ik that pays a net transfer to i in equilibrium (i.e., r ij < 1) will offer a truthful compensation schedule reflecting the transfer cost: c
Exporters that receive a transfer from i in equilibrium (i.e., r ij > 1) are not directly affected by the transfer cost, and thus offer the usual contribution schedules, but because the importer pays the transfer cost, it sets the negotiated tariff, τ n ik (A ik ) = arg max w ik (τ ik )+κ ] . The first-order condition for this problem is:
The term in braces is the marginal cost of rasing the tariff due to transfer cost considerations. In the special cases of no transfer cost (κ = 1) or perfect balance (r ij = 1 for all j), this term disappears and we are left with the usual condition for Pareto efficiency for participants. Otherwise, the negotiated tariff will deviate from Pareto efficiency in proportion to the exports of the two sets of participating exporters. The greater the exports of the set of countries to which country i is in deficit (r ij > 1), the greater will be the marginal cost of raising the tariff, because such a move worsens country i s deficit with these countries. The greater the exports of the set of countries with which country i has a surplus (r ij < 1), the lower will be the marginal cost of raising the tariff, because such countries offer less generous compensation schedules. Assuming i is either in deficit or surplus with every exporter, the negotiated tariff becomes, (17) where M mfn jk is the volume of j 's MFN imports of good k. Given that we use an approximation for r ij and that B ik is sensitive to whether r ij is above or below the threashold of 1, we run the risk of serious measurement error. To mitigate this, we proxy B ik with the export-weighted average deficit ratio, B * ik ≡ j∈C θ j ik r ij . Source: WITS plus additional data sources (see text). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (1) and (5), we instrument the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, whenever it appears. In regressions (6)- (8), we also instrument for HIEE, whenever it appears. Source: WITS plus additional data sources (see text). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Clustered standard errors in parentheses: in (1), (2), (5)- (8), Diff regressions use multiway clustering by country and SITC4, while HIEE regressions use multiway clustering by country and HS3 by country; in (3), (4), (9) and (10), Diff regressions are clustered by SITC4, while HIEE regressions are clustered by HS3 by country. Importing country fixed effects are included in each regression, except (9) and (10) . We instrument the HHI and HIEE, wherever they appear. importing country, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. ♦ is significant at the 14% level. Importing country fixed effects are included in each regression. Outliers (MFN tariff rates higher than 50) are excluded.
MFN tariff rates (in percentage points) are simple averages at the 4 digit level ISIC(Rev.2). Industries are defined as 3-digit ISIC(Rev.2) codes. The Diffshare is the share of 5-digit US SIC products in each 4-digit ISIC(Rev.2) category that are classified as differentiated according to Rauch. The High Inverse Export Elasticity (HIEE) is equal to 1 if the inverse export elasticity of the product is above the 33rd percentile of elasticities of that country. X /M equals the ratio of output value to imports in each sector.
Except in regressions (1) and (5), we instrument the Herfindhal-Hirschman index and HIEE whereever they appear. 
